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We hold that when public employees make statements
pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not
speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and
the Constitution does not insulate them from discipline.
-

Justice Anthony Kennedy in Garcetti v. Ceballos. 1

The American people are the only ones who lose if
government employees are silenced, because only a
corrupt government gains from that, and the five Justices
who took an oath to protect the Constitution of the United
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States for the citizens of the country were the ones who
were now violating their oath.
-

Michale Callahan. 2
I.

INTRODUCTION

The United States Supreme Court has had its share of shameful
rulings. 3 The great Erwin Chemerinsky wrote that we should “appreciate the
powerful case against the Supreme Court for the choices it has made
throughout history.” 4 Another scholar wrote that the “list is so long, so
infamous, and so disturbingly regular—recurring consistently over time—that
one must seriously question whether the Supreme Court has been, on
balance, a positive or negative force in our nation’s constitutional history.” 5
Many of these horrible rulings are well known. For example, the
Court permitted slavery with its wretched decision in Dred Scott v.
Sandford, 6 legalized segregation in Plessy v. Ferguson, 7 and supported the
internment of 110,000 Japanese-American citizens in Korematsu v. United
States. 8 These three decisions reek of abject racism and have been
condemned in the annals of history. 9

MICHALE CALLAHAN, TOO POLITICALLY SENSITIVE 351 (2009).
JOEL D. JOSEPH, BLACK MONDAYS: WORST DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT 21
(1990).
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, THE CASE AGAINST THE SUPREME COURT 342 (2015).
Michael S. Paulsen, The Worst Constitutional Decision of All Time, 78 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 995, 1001 (2003).
60 U.S. 393 (1857); see BERNARD SCHWARTZ, A HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 106
(1993) (calling the Dred Scott decision a “judicial blunder”).
163 U.S. 537 (1896); see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 4, at 35 (“The most important
such case was Plessy v. Ferguson, in 1896. It, too, is widely regarded as one of the Supreme
Court’s worst decisions.”).
323 U.S. 214 (1944); see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 4, at 57 (“Korematsu is deeply
objectionable because the government used ethnicity alone as the basis for predicting who
was a threat to national security and who would remain free.”).
Gerald N. Rosenberg, Courting Disaster: Looking for Change in All the Wrong Places, 54
DRAKE L. REV. 795, 797 (2006) (“For most of U.S. history the Supreme Court has supported
and reinforced racial discrimination against non-whites.”); see also Maureen Johnson,
2
3

4
5

6

7

8

9

Separate But (Un)Equal: Why Institutionalized Anti-Racism is Never the Answer to the
Never-ending Cycle of Plessy v. Ferguson, 52 U. RICH. L. REV. 327, 327 (2018) (“For
decades, Plessy v. Ferguson has been identified as one of the worst decisions ever handed
down by the Supreme Court.”); Austin Allen, Rethinking Dred Scott: New Context for an
Old Case, 82 CHI. KENT L. REV. 141, 141 (2007) (“Almost everyone despises Dred Scott.”);
Corinna Barrett Lain, Three Supreme Court “Failures” and a Story of Success, 69 VAND. L.
REV. 1019, 1020 (2018) (listing Plessy and Korematsu—along with Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S.
200 (1927)—as three of the Court’s worst decisions).
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However, another decision of a more recent vintage deserves its
rightful place in the Court’s hall of shame: Garcetti v. Ceballos. 10 In Garcetti,
the Court issued a decision that serves as a Dred Scott-type ruling for public
employees, diminishing their free speech rights to an unacceptable level.
The Court created a categorical rule that public employees have no free
speech rights when engaged in official, job-related speech. 11
Under Garcetti, it does not matter how valuable an employee’s
speech is, how much corruption that speech exposes, or whether the speech
informs the public regarding an important issue. Instead, the five-justice
majority focused solely on creating a bright-line rule eviscerating the free
speech rights of employees. The decision led to a “sea change in public
employee First Amendment jurisprudence.” 12 It also led to a terrible
phenomenon of eponymous infamy, as plaintiff’s attorneys commonly refer
to their public employee clients who have been “Garcettized.” 13 Today, the
Garcetti decision continues to wreak havoc on countless public employees
across the country. 14
Part II of this essay briefly discusses the pre-Garcetti landscape of
public-employee-related First Amendment jurisprudence, with a focus on
the Court’s, now defunct, balancing test for addressing such complaints,
followed by a discussion of Garcetti and its multiple dissents. Part III
addresses several lower court decisions illustrating how Garcetti has led to
unfair results and unnecessarily diminished the free speech rights of police
officers, firefighters, public school teachers, and other public employees.
Finally, part IV discusses two slight retreats from the broad categorical rule
created in Garcetti. These retrenchments are important, but better still
would be the abrogation of Garcetti itself.

10
11

547 U.S. 410 (2006).

Id. at 421.

David L. Hudson, Jr., Commentary: Public-Employee Speech and the Garcetti Effect,
GETLEGAL (Sept. 28, 2009), https://www.getlegal.com/legal-info-center/commentary-publicemployee-speech-and-the-garcetti-effect/ [https://perma.cc/HR7P-UXHZ].
David L. Hudson, Jr., Public Employees, Private Speech: 1st Amendment Doesn’t Always
Protect Government Workers, ABA JOURNAL (May 1, 2017, 4:10 AM),
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/public_employees_private_speech
[https://perma.cc/85PC-WE8S]; see also David L. Hudson, Jr., Garcettized! ’06 Ruling Still
Zapping
Speech,
FREEDOM
F.
INST.
(Jan.
15,
2010),
https://www.freedomforuminstitute.org/2010/01/15/garcettized-06-ruling-still-zappingspeech/ [https://perma.cc/DA2F-KG9A].
David L. Hudson, Jr., No Free Speech for You, SLATE (Aug. 4, 2017),
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2017/08/anthony-kennedy-has-the-chance-to-undo-hisworst-first-amendment-decision.html [https://perma.cc/PR44-JS6Q]; David L. Hudson, Jr.,
Another Public Employee ‘Garcettized’ in Chicago Cop Case, FREE SPEECH CTR. (May 12,
2018),
https://www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/post/126/another-public-employeegarcettized-in-chicago-cop-case [https://perma.cc/W7HB-7LHD].
12

13

14
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GARCETTI FUNDAMENTALLY CHANGED PUBLIC
EMPLOYEE FREE SPEECH LAW

Historically, public employees possessed no free speech rights on
the job. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, then with the Massachusetts
Supreme Court, captured this reality when he wrote, “petitioner may have
a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be
a policeman.” 15 At its core, the Court held that public employees willingly
relinquished their free speech rights when they accepted employment with
the government. 16
The U.S. Supreme Court recognized the unfairness of this
approach in the 1960s, reasoning that public employees had the right to
speak out on matters of public concern or importance. 17 In Pickering v.
Board of Education, the Court ruled that a public school teacher had a freespeech right to criticize the school board over its allocation of money
between academics and athletics. 18 The school board had fired science
teacher Marvin Pickering after he wrote a letter to the editor of his local
newspaper criticizing the school board’s elevation of athletic interests over
academics. 19 The Court explained, “[t]he problem in any case is to arrive at
a balance between the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting
upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer,
in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its
employees.” 20
The Court reasoned that Pickering’s letter was a matter of public
importance to the community and that his comments did not harm the
“close working relationships” he had at the school with his fellow teachers
and administrators. 21 In other words, Pickering’s speech did not negatively
impact his fellow teachers, his students, or the principals. Rather, he
criticized only the school board.
Notably, the Court emphasized that public employees are often
best positioned to offer keen insight into the operation of public
institutions. 22 Marvin Pickering had such insight. As a public-school teacher,
he was uniquely situated to understand how the school board spent money
15
16

McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220 (1892).

See, e.g., United Pub. Workers of Am. v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 99 (1947) (“Congress and

the President are responsible for an efficient public service. If, in their judgment, efficiency
may be best obtained by prohibiting active participation by classified employees in politics as
party officers or workers, we see no constitutional objection.”).
Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
Id. at 574.
Id. at 566.
Id. at 568.
Id. at 570.
Id. at 572.
17
18
19
20
21
22
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on academics and athletics. That speech was valuable to his community
because taxpayer dollars were potentially mismanaged.
The Court later refined its balancing test in Connick v. Myers, a
case involving an assistant district attorney who was fired after circulating a
questionnaire in his workplace challenging office practices. 23 Even though
one of the questions touched on matters of public importance, the Court
determined that Myers’s questionnaire negatively impacted the operation of
the District Attorney’s Office. 24 The Court wrote: “When close working
relationships are essential to fulfilling public responsibilities, a wide degree
of deference to the employer’s judgment is appropriate.” 25
Thus, the Court created a balancing test, known as the “PickeringConnick test,” which dominated public employee free speech jurisprudence
for decades. 26 Under this approach, the Court first asked whether the
employee spoke on a matter of public concern or whether the employee
merely engaged in a personal grievance. 27 If the speech was merely a private
grievance, then no First Amendment protections attached. 28 Alternatively, if
the speech touched on a matter of public concern, the Court balanced the
employee’s right to engage in such speech against the employer’s interest in
an efficient, disruption-free workplace. 29
This standard changed when Los Angeles Assistant District
Attorney Richard Ceballos ran afoul of his superiors. Ceballos wrote a
memorandum to his bosses recommending dismissal of criminal charges in
a case regarding perjured law enforcement testimony. 30 Ceballos believed a
sheriff’s deputy had given false testimony in a search warrant affidavit. 31
Ceballos wrote the memo and later testified for the defense as to the viability
of the warrant. 32 As a result, his superiors stripped him of supervisory duties
and transferred him to a less desirable work location. 33

23

461 U.S. 138 (1983).

Id. at 151–52.
Id.
Sonya Bice, Tough Talk from the Supreme Court on Free Speech: The Illusory Per Se
Rule in Garcetti as Further Evidence of Connick’s Unworkable Employee/Citizen Speech
Partition, 8 J.L. SOCIETY 45, 54 (2007) (noting that the Supreme Court had a balancing test
in place for four decades prior to Garcetti).
No Free Speech for You, supra note 14.
Id.
See First Amendment Protections on Public College and University Campuses: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on the Const. and Civ. Just. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th
24
25
26

27
28
29

Cong. 4 (2017) (written testimony of David L. Hudson, Jr., Ombudsman, Newseum Inst.
First Amendment Ctr.).
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 414 (2006).
30
31
32
33

Id.
Id. at 414–15.
Id. at 415.
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Ceballos sued in federal court, alleging his work transfer was
retaliation against protected speech. The federal district court ruled in favor
of the government, finding Ceballos had no First Amendment protection in
his work memo. 34 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, finding that
“Ceballos’s allegations of wrongdoing in the memorandum constituted
protected speech under the First Amendment.” 35 The appeals court first
noted that Ceballos’s speech, contained in the memo, was inherently a
matter of public concern. 36 The Ninth Circuit then proceeded to apply the
Pickering-Connick balancing test and found in favor of Ceballos, noting that
his memo did not cause any disruption in the workplace. 37
The government appealed to the Supreme Court, and the case
was actually argued twice before the Court. 38 Initially, the Court appeared
sharply divided and, by late Justice John Paul Stevens’ account, leaning
toward a 5-4 decision in favor of Ceballos. 39 But the Court’s composition
changed when Justice Samuel A. Alito Jr. replaced retiring Justice Sandra
Day O’Connor. 40 Without O’Connor, the Court faced the prospect of a 44 split. 41 The Alito-O’Connor change required the Court to hear oral
arguments again, and the Court ruled in favor of the District Attorney’s
Office. 42
Justice Kennedy, who wrote the majority opinion, noted that the
Court should not “constitutionalize the employee grievance.” 43 The Court
emphasized that Ceballos’s job required he write the memo in question. 44
Most importantly, Kennedy created a new threshold categorical rule: “We
hold that when public employees make statements pursuant to their official
duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment

Ceballos v. Garcetti, CV0011106AHMAJWX, 2002 WL 34098285, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Jan.
30, 2002).
Ceballos v. Garcetti, 361 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2004).
Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 416.
Id. (citing Ceballos, 361 F.3d at 1180).
Jessica Reed, From Pickering to Ceballos: The Demise of the Public Employee Free
Speech Doctrine, 11 CUNY L. REV. 95, 97 n.16 (2007).
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS, THE MAKING OF A JUSTICE: REFLECTIONS ON MY FIRST 94
YEARS 456 (2019) (“Astute observers of the Court correctly inferred that Sandra had
provided the decisive vote for the opposite result in all three before she retired. Otherwise
there would have been no need to reargue any of them.”).
See Lyle Denniston, Court to Rehear Public Employee Speech Case, SCOTUSBLOG (Feb.
17, 2006, 12:22 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2006/02/court-to-rehear-publicemployee-speech-case/ [https://perma.cc/A6BD-SJAA].
34

35
36
37
38

39

40

41
42
43
44

Id.
Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 410.
Id. at 420 (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 154 (1983)).
Id. at 421.
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purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their communications
from employer discipline.” 45
Justice Kennedy also explained that “[r]estricting speech that owes
its existence to a public employee’s professional responsibilities does not
infringe any liberties the employee might have enjoyed as a private citizen.” 46
He emphasized that public employee supervisors must be able to ensure
their employees’ official communications are “accurate, demonstrate sound
judgment, and promote the employer’s mission.” 47 Kennedy even invoked
the constitutional principles of federalism and separation of powers to justify
the rule, explaining how “judicial intervention in the conduct of
governmental operations” could threaten these seminal constitutional
principles. 48
Three Justices—John Paul Stevens, David Souter, and Stephen
Breyer—authored separate dissents. Justice Stevens described the all-ornothing, wholly citizen speech or entirely employee speech, majority
approach as “quite wrong,” noting, “it seems perverse to fashion a new rule
that provides employees with an incentive to voice their concerns publicly
before talking frankly to their superiors.” 49 In a lengthier dissent, Justice
Souter proposed a modified Pickering-Connick test. 50 In rejecting the
categorical exclusion created by Garcetti, Souter argued:
[P]rivate and public interests in addressing official
wrongdoing and threats to health and safety can outweigh
the government’s stake in the efficient implementation of
policy, and when they do, public employees who speak on
these matters in the course of their duties should be eligible
to claim First Amendment protection. 51
For his part, Justice Breyer emphasized that Ceballos, as a prosecutor, had
professional obligations to voice his concerns about potentially perjured law
enforcement testimony. 52 For Justice Breyer, these “professional and special
constitutional obligations” counseled in favor of protecting such employee
speech. 53
Many legal commentators questioned the Garcetti decision from
the outset. 54 Sheldon Nahmod wrote, “Garcetti is unsound as a matter of
Id.
Id. at 412.
Id. at 422–23.
Id. at 423.
Id. at 427 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 427–44 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Id. at 428 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Id. at 447 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id.
Paul M. Secunda, Garcetti’s Impact on the First Amendment Speech Rights of Federal
Employees, 7 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 117, 117 (2008) (“Through its holding, the Court has

45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
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First Amendment policy because it under-protects public employee speech
that is vital to self-government.” 55 Professor Helen Norton, a leading expert
on government speech, criticized the Garcetti decision, writing: “Lower
courts now routinely apply Garcetti’s expedited review to dispose of
government workers’ First Amendment claims at great cost to the public’s
interest in government transparency, precisely the value that the government
speech doctrine supposedly protects.” 56
III.

EGREGIOUS EXAMPLES OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEES BEING
“GARCETTIZED”

The Garcetti decision spread through the defense bar like greased
lightning and led to a significant reduction in free speech protections for
countless public employees. A few of the notable casualties follow.

A.

Speech about Rank Corruption in Law Enforcement Not Protected
Speech

Perhaps the starkest example of Garcetti’s unfairness concerns
former Illinois State Police Officer Michale Callahan, a courageous law
enforcement official who faced retaliation after exposing the innocence of
two men on death row and the corruption of his superior officers. 57 In the
spring of 2000, the Illinois State Police (ISP) received a letter from a private
investigator asking the agency to review the 1986 murders of Dyke and
Karen Rhoads. 58 The ISP assigned the matter to Lt. Callahan. 59 His
investigation uncovered a strong likelihood that the men convicted of the
Rhoads’ murders—Herbert Whitlock and Randy Steidl—were, in fact,
innocent. 60 Callahan and his captain, Steven Fermon, presented their
now made it nearly impossible for conscientious public servants to speak out in the best
interests of the public without jeopardizing their career.”); Beth Ann Roesler, Garcetti v.
Ceballos: Judicially Muzzling the Voices of Public Sector Employees, 53 S.D. L. REV. 397,
397 (2008) (noting how Garcetti “unduly expanded the powers of the government employer
at the expense of its employees and the general public”); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Tending to
Potted Plants: The Professional Identity Vacuum in Garcetti v. Ceballos, 12 NEV. L.J. 703,
708 (2013) (explaining “Garcetti is poorly reasoned as a matter of First Amendment
doctrine”); Margaret Tarkington, Government Speech and the Publicly Employed Attorney,
2010 B.Y.U. L. REV. 2175, 2178 (2010) (noting Garcetti is “particularly troubling as applied
to publicly employed attorney speech”).
Sheldon Nahmod, Public Employee Speech, Categorical Balancing, and § 1983: A Critique
of Garcetti v. Ceballos, 42 U. RICH. L. REV. 561, 563 (2008).
HELEN NORTON, THE GOVERNMENT’S SPEECH AND THE CONSTITUTION 62 (2019).
Callahan v. Fermon, 526 F.3d 1040, 1042 (7th Cir. 2008).
55

56
57
58
59
60

Id.
Id.
Id.
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findings at the ISP Academy, arguing that the governor of Illinois should
grant clemency to both Whitlock and Steidl. 61
Callahan soon became suspicious that Robert Morgan, a person of
interest in the initial investigation, was involved in the murders. 62 Callahan
also suspected Cpt. Fermon had deliberately compromised the Morgan
investigation. 63 After Callahan learned Morgan was under federal
investigation for possible drug trafficking and money laundering, 64 he
relayed these suspicions to his commander, Diane Carper. 65 Carper ordered
him to stop investigating the Rhoads murders. 66
In April 2003, Callahan filed a complaint with the Department of
Internal Investigations (DII), claiming Cpt. Fermon’s potential involvement
with organized crime had interfered with a federal criminal investigation. 67
The tension between Callahan and his captain became tangible. Around the
time Callahan filed his DII complaints, the ISP’s Equal Employment
Opportunity Office began investigating a hostile-work-environment
complaint related to his and Fermon’s interactions. 68 Soon after, Carper
transferred Callahan to a patrol position in another district. 69
Callahan sued in federal district court, alleging retaliation for his
speech exposing Cpt. Fermon’s corruption and for other statements related
to the Rhoads investigation. 70 A federal jury awarded Callahan $210,000 in
compensatory damages and more than $480,000 in punitive damages. 71 The
federal district court judge reduced the punitive damages to $150,000. 72
The defendants, including Cpt. Fermon, appealed. 73 During the
pendency of the appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Garcetti. 74 On
appeal, the Seventh Circuit applied Garcetti’s categorical rule and
determined Callahan’s speech to the ISP Academy, as well as his criticisms
of his superiors, was official job-related speech. 75 The Seventh Circuit noted
that lieutenants regularly make formal speeches at the ISP Academy as part

61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73

Id. at 1042–43.
Id. at 1042.
Id. at 1043.
Id. at 1042.
Id.
Id. at 1042–43.
Id. at 1043.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006); Callahan, 526 F.3d at 1040 (stating the original
case was filed September 23, 2003).
Callahan, 526 F.3d at 1045.
74

75
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of their job duties. 76 The appeals court also found Callahan “spoke pursuant
to his official duties when he twice complained to the DII about Cpt.
Fermon and Cdr. Carter.” 77 The Seventh Circuit noted that ISP rules
require officers to report incidents of misconduct by fellow officers. 78
In his memoir, Callahan railed against the unfairness of the Garcetti
ruling, stating, “How ludicrous, I always thought I was a citizen when I spoke
up, and I certainly didn’t realize that once I put my gun and badge on, I
stopped being a citizen[.]” 79 He also noted that several members of his
federal jury called his lawyer to complain about the inequity of the Seventh
Circuit’s decision and the political corruption endured by Callahan. 80

B.

Revealing a Leak in Law Enforcement Leads to Punishment Not
Praise

Like Callahan, Martin Sigsworth knows full well the phenomenon
of being “Garcettized” after revealing corruption in law enforcement.
Sigsworth, an investigator for the Aurora, Illinois Police Department,
worked on a multi-jurisdictional task force designed to address gang activity
in the area. 81 Joining the department in 1992, Sigsworth later began working
with federal agencies to combat gang and drug activity in Aurora. 82 In 2002,
the task force obtained numerous arrest warrants for suspected drug dealers
and gang leaders. 83
Before the task force could move on the stash houses associated
with the targets, some of the task force seemingly gave the targets notice of
the impending raid. 84 As a result, several key individuals evaded arrest. 85
Sigsworth reported to his Chief of Police that several task force members
likely committed misconduct that led to the botched raid. 86 Shortly
thereafter, the department removed Sigsworth from the task force and the
resulting investigation. 87

Id. (noting lieutenants were regularly required to attend meetings and exchange information
at the Academy and that Callahan was required to appear during business hours and report
on activities he had been paid to perform).
76

77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87

Id.
Id.

CALLAHAN, supra note 2, at 355.

Id. at 356.

Sigsworth v. City of Aurora, 487 F.3d 506, 507 (7th Cir. 2007).

Id. at 508 (stating that Sigsworth began work on the task force in 1998).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Sigsworth filed a federal lawsuit, alleging retaliation based on his
protected speech regarding possible corruption in the task force. 88 A federal
district court ruled in favor of the city, finding that Sigsworth spoke as an
employee rather than as a citizen. 89 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed
the lower court’s ruling against Sigsworth. 90
On appeal, Sigsworth argued that his speech should be protected
because it “constituted matters of the utmost concern to the public.” 91
However, the Seventh Circuit again relied on the categorical rule in Garcetti,
effectively barring Sigsworth’s claim. 92 The appeals court wrote: “Sigsworth
was not speaking as a citizen when he reported to his superiors his
suspicions of misconduct by his colleagues.” 93 The Seventh Circuit
conceded Sigsworth did what any member of the task force should have
done when he discovered his colleague’s misconduct—that is, he reported
the wrongdoing. 94 However, the court concluded, “Sigsworth’s report to his
supervisors of the suspected misconduct was part of his official duties as an
investigator and member of the task force and, therefore, outside the scope
of First Amendment protection.” 95

C.

Fire Chief’s Revelations about Inadequate Staffing Lead to
Termination

The tale of Charles D. Foley, Jr. offers another egregious example
of a public servant who spoke the truth and paid the price following
Garcetti. 96 Foley served as Chief of the Fire Department for Randolph,
Massachusetts. 97 In May 2007, the fire department responded to a fire at a
single-family residence in the town. 98 “[T]wo children, ages seventeen and
ten, [perished in the fire, as they] were trapped in a second floor
bedroom.” 99

88
89
90
91
92
93
94

Id.
Id.
Id. at 512.
Id. at 509.
Id.
Id. at 510.
Id. at 511 (“Sigsworth’s allegations indicate that in reporting his suspicions, he was merely

doing what was expected of him as a member of the task force.”).
Id. at 512.
Foley v. Town of Randolph, 598 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2010) (holding that the chief “was
speaking in his official capacity and not as a citizen” when he made the statements, and the
statements were therefore not protected by the First Amendment).
Id. at 2.
95
96

97
98
99

Id.
Id.
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At the scene of the fatal fire, Foley, the state fire marshal, and
another employee from the fire marshal’s office spoke to the media. 100 Foley
was in uniform at the time of his press conference, and he “spoke about the
details of the fire,” but also mentioned concerns about insufficient funding
and personnel at the fire department. 101 He indicated that allowing more
manpower would have made the firefighting process “more professional[]
and more according to standard.” 102 He also stated: “I’ve been asking to
replace the fire fighters here in the Town over the last five years and it seems
to have fallen on deaf ears.” 103 Further, Foley told the press: “As many of
you are here today, you have the resources to bring this information to the
public.” 104
Town leaders who were upset that Foley spoke candidly to the
media 105 brought disciplinary charges against him, claiming he used poor
judgment in speaking to the press about alleged deficiencies in fire
protection services. 106 During these proceedings, a town-appointed hearing
officer determined Foley made “inappropriate, inaccurate, intemperate,
and misleading statements to the news media” and recommended a fifteenday suspension, which the Town’s Board of Selectmen upheld. 107
Foley filed a lawsuit in federal district court, alleging a violation of
his First Amendment rights and several state law claims based on his use of
protected speech. 108 The court noted that Foley’s employment contract
neither authorized nor required he make public statements as part of his
job duties but added that “nothing in the contract or the statute prohibited
Foley from doing so.” 109 Proceeding along these lines, the federal district
court found that the statements were “made pursuant to [Foley]’s official job
duties” and granted summary judgment in the town’s favor. 110 On appeal,
the First Circuit affirmed. 111 In so doing, the court held that the issue of
whether or not Foley was required to speak to the media as part of his
official duties was not dispositive in the matter. 112 Rather, the court of appeals
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emphasized how Foley chose to speak to the news media while he was on
duty and in uniform. 113
The appeals court explained: “As Chief, he had been in
command of the scene, and when choosing to speak to the press, he would
naturally be regarded as the public face of the Department when speaking
about matters involving the Department.” 114 The First Circuit decision
emphasized that there was no relevant citizen analogue to his speech. 115
Rather, he spoke as the fire chief at a forum that he had access to solely
because of his position. 116 The court noted “the subject of Foley’s speech
was entirely related to matters concerning the Fire Department,” 117 and
added, “there could be no doubt that Foley was speaking in his official
capacity and not as a citizen.” 118 Finally, the First Circuit concluded: “We
hold that when the circumstances surrounding a government employee’s
speech indicate that the employee is speaking in his official capacity,
Garcetti dictates that we strike the balance in favor of the government
employer.” 119

D. Teacher’s Warning of Scabies Outbreak Not Protected Speech
Yvonne Massaro, an art teacher at Edward Murrow High School
in New York City, was also “Garcettized.” 120 In December 2005, Massaro
informed school officials that she had contracted scabies, which she
believed was caused by the unsanitary conditions in her classroom. 121 She
submitted several documents to the New York Department of Education,
including an injury report and an accident report. 122 The injury report
revealed that she had been bitten by mites in her classroom. 123 The report
also revealed what Massaro called “an unclean working environment.” 124
Additionally, she expressed concern about the school’s failure to clean her
classroom or move her to a different classroom. 125 Massaro complained
about these issues several times to school administrators. 126
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After her complaints, Massaro alleged school officials changed
her schedule unfavorably and canceled one of her classes. 127 She filed a
federal lawsuit, contending officials retaliated against her for her use of
protected speech. 128 A federal district court granted summary judgment to
the Department of Education, reasoning that Massaro spoke as an
employee, rather than as a citizen, when she made the complaints. 129
On appeal, a three-judge panel of the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed. 130 The Second Circuit held that Massaro made her
statements “as a public school teacher” within the meaning of the Garcetti
standard. 131 The appeals court concluded: “We have no difficulty in
concluding on this record that Massaro spoke as an employee—not as a
private citizen.” 132

E.

Teacher’s Complaints of Falsifying Test Results Not Protected Speech

Another public school teacher learned of Garcetti’s long reach
when he contested his termination on First Amendment grounds. 133 Bruno
Mpoy, a special education teacher at Ludlow Elementary School with the
Washington D.C. Teaching Fellows, alleged the school’s principal, Donald
Presswood, instructed him to falsify his students’ test results. 134 Mpoy further
claimed that when he refused to falsify the test scores, Presswood enlisted
other teachers to do so. 135 Mpoy sent a letter to Michelle Rhee, Chancellor
of the Washington D.C. School District, complaining about a lack of
classroom supplies, inadequate classroom facilities, lack of teaching
assistants, and the order from Principal Presswood to falsify test scores. 136
Two months later, Mpoy was terminated. 137
Mpoy sued in federal court, alleging retaliation for speech
protected by the First Amendment. 138 The federal district court determined
Mpoy’s complaints were “‘part-and-parcel’ of his concerns as a school
teacher,” noting that the vast majority of the complaints related directly to
Mpoy’s classroom. 139 Mpoy contended he spoke as a public citizen when he
127
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raised the issue of the falsification of test scores. 140 However, the federal
district court reasoned that Mpoy’s complaints related to his responsibilities
as a public school teacher and noted that Mpoy raised his complaints up the
“chain of command” rather than outside it. 141 The court concluded:
“Although the Court is not unsympathetic to what Plaintiff alleges occurred
here—indeed, his allegations are quite troubling, particularly in the realm of
falsification of test scores—it nonetheless cannot find that [Mpoy] has alleged
a violation of the First Amendment.” 142

F.

Custodian’s Warning about Asbestos Not Protected Speech

Another Garcetti victim was a New York-based custodian who
was fired after complaining about possible asbestos contamination at a
public high school. 143 Norman Morey worked for the Somers County School
District for twenty years until his termination, with nine of those years spent
as head custodian. 144 “In May 2003, Morey received a phone call that there
was a mess in the high school gymnasium” where he found “[g]rayish-white
chunks and larger pieces of insulation . . . [that had] fallen from the
ceiling.” 145
Morey informed the Superintendent of Buildings and
Transportation that the fallen material could contain asbestos and expressed
his view about closing the gym pending a thorough evaluation. 146 The
Superintendent told Morey to simply tape up the loose insulation. 147 Morey
was told “not to be a troublemaker” and that “the administration ha[d] ways
of dealing with troublemakers.” 148 Later, administrators terminated Morey
for allegedly submitting inaccurate timesheets and verbally abusing custodial
staff. 149 Morey sued, contending administrators terminated him in retaliation
for his warnings about possible asbestos contamination at the high school. 150
A federal district court judge dismissed Morey’s lawsuit based on
Garcetti. 151 The judge determined that the core duties of Morey’s job related
to maintaining school buildings and grounds and concluded: “[I]t was clear
that Morey was acting in furtherance of his core duty when he asserted that
140
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the fallen insulation materials in the gymnasium might contain asbestos and
that the area should be tested to resolve the issue.” 152
These decisions are troubling and should alarm reasonable people
who care about government transparency, the rule of law, and fundamental
fairness. A law enforcement official who exposes corruption and a cover-up
with regard to a cold case should not face retaliation like Michale Callahan. 153
A police officer who reveals a leak in a multi-jurisdictional task force like
Martin Sigsworth should be commended, not chastised and relocated. 154
The public deserves to hear that a fire department may be underfunded and
understaffed, as Charles Foley told his community in Randolph,
Massachusetts. 155 Quite simply, the public benefits from learning about
problems in places of public employment because these places of
employment often serve significant functions for society at large. It makes
little sense to deprive the public of its best sources of information – that is,
the employees who actually witness problems firsthand.
IV.

SLIGHT EXCEPTIONS TO GARCETTI

There have been two slight retreats from Garcetti in recent
years. 156 The first deals with First Amendment protection for public
employees punished for truthful, in-court testimony when such testimony is
not a regular aspect of their job duties. 157 The second addresses some lower
courts’ recognition that Garcetti should not apply with full force in university
settings. 158

A.

Protecting Truthful Testimony in Court

The Supreme Court provided a small, welcome relief from Garcetti
for public employees who do not normally testify in court but who have
been punished for providing truthful sworn testimony under oath in Lane
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v. Franks. Edward Lane was the director of Community Intensive Training
159

for Youth (CITY) and was employed by Central Alabama Community
College (CACC). 160 Lane conducted an audit in response to CITY’s financial
difficulties and uncovered that Suzanne Schmitz, an Alabama State
Representative on CITY’s payroll, had failed to report to her CITY office. 161
Lane fired Schmitz after she refused to show up at her CITY
office, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation initiated an investigation into
her employment with CITY. 162 Lane later testified before a federal grand
jury about his decision to fire Schmitz. 163 In January 2008, the grand jury
indicted Schmitz on four counts of mail fraud and four counts of theft. 164
Later, at Schmitz’s trial, Lane testified under subpoena as to the events that
led to Schmitz’s termination. 165 The jury failed to reach a verdict. 166
Six months later, federal prosecutors re-tried Schmitz, and Lane
testified again. 167 This time, the jury convicted Schmitz of three counts of
mail fraud and four counts of theft. 168 Steve Franks, who became president
of CACC, later terminated Lane. 169 Lane sued in federal court, contending
his termination resulted from his truthful courtroom testimony in the
Schmitz matter. 170 A federal district court granted summary judgment to
Franks based on qualified immunity and Garcetti. 171 Relying extensively on
Garcetti, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, finding no violation of clearly
established law because Lane’s testimony related to his official job duties
within the meaning of Garcetti. 172
After granting certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed, writing
“[t]truthful testimony by a public employee outside the scope of his ordinary
job duties is speech as a citizen for First Amendment purposes.” 173 The
Court also explained, “Sworn testimony in judicial proceedings is a
quintessential example of speech as a citizen for a simple reason: Anyone
who testifies in court bears an obligation, to the court and society at large, to
tell the truth.” 174 The Court distinguished Lane from Garcetti, noting that
159
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Lane’s in-court testimony was different from an internal memorandum
prepared by a deputy district attorney for his office. 175 Furthermore, the
Court emphasized that the key question under Garcetti is whether the
speech in question is “ordinarily within the scope of an employee’s
duties.” 176
While the Court’s decision in Lane v. Franks is narrow and
arguably does not apply to public employees who regularly testify in court
as part of their jobs, the decision is still significant because it represents a
slight retreat from Garcetti. 177 The decision also reiterates the point Justice
Thurgood Marshall made so forcefully in Pickering—that “speech by public
employees on subject matter related to their employment holds special
value precisely because those employees gain knowledge of matters of
public concern through their employment.” 178

B.

Garcetti in the University Setting

In Garcetti, Justices Kennedy and Souter sparred over whether
the majority’s holding of no First Amendment protection for official, jobrelated speech would apply to the expression of university professors and
academic professionals. 179 In his dissent, Souter warned that the holding
would imperil university professors’ speech and academic freedom. 180
Souter noted the Supreme Court once referred to academic freedom as a
“transcendent value to all of us” 181 and that “[t]he vigilant protection of
constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community of
American schools.” 182
Kennedy responded to Souter’s warnings, noting “[t]here is some
argument that expression related to academic scholarship or classroom
instruction implicates additional constitutional interests that are not fully
accounted for by this Court’s customary employee-speech jurisprudence.” 183
However, Kennedy ultimately sidestepped the question as to whether the
holding applies “in the same manner to a case involving speech related to
scholarship or teaching.” 184
175
176
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Only two federal appellate circuits, the Fourth and the Ninth,
have ruled Garcetti does not apply in university settings. 185 The Fourth
Circuit first rejected Garcetti in the university setting in the case of Michael
Adams, an associate professor of criminology at the University of North
Carolina Wilmington. 186 Adams alleged university officials denied him a
promotion to full professor because of the conservative Christian viewpoints
reflected in his columns and books. 187 A federal district court denied his
claims, in part based on Garcetti. 188 On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reinstated
Adams’s First Amendment claims. 189 The court explained: “We are also
persuaded that Garcetti would not apply in the academic context of a public
university as represented by the facts of this case” because doing so “could
place beyond the reach of First Amendment protection many forms of
public speech or service a professor engaged in during his employment.” 190
The Ninth Circuit also rejected the use of Garcetti in an academic
setting in the case of David Demers, a tenured associate professor at
Washington State University. 191 Demers claimed university officials
retaliated against him by lowering his evaluation scores because of a
pamphlet called “The 7 Step Plan” and his book entitled The Ivory Tower
of Babel. 192
A federal district court granted summary judgment to the
university administrators. 193 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed, noting
“Demers presents the kind of case that worried Justice Souter.” 194 The Ninth
Circuit determined “Garcetti does not—indeed, consistent with the First
Amendment, cannot—apply to teaching and academic writing that are
performed ‘pursuant to the official duties’ of a teacher and professor.” 195
See David L. Hudson, Jr., Are Free Speech and Academic Freedom Under Assault at
Colleges
and
Universities?
AM.
BAR
ASS’N
J.
(Oct.
1,
2018),
185

http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/free_speech_academic_freedom_buchanan
[https://perma.cc/VS5V-ETWV].
Adams v. Tr. of the Univ. of N.C.-Wilmington, 640 F.3d 550 (4th Cir. 2011).
Id. at 557.
Id. at 561 (explaining the district court held Adams’s listing of his written work and public
appearances in a promotional application was speech made pursuant to his official duties
and therefore not protected by the First Amendment).
Id. at 562 (finding the district court’s conclusion that Adams’s speech was converted from
protected to unprotected to be erroneous).
Id. at 562–64.
Demers v. Austin, 746 F.3d 402, 406 (9th Cir. 2014).
Id. at 406–08. Both the book, a draft of which was attached to Demers’s 2007 sabbatical
application, and the pamphlet, which Demers distributed widely, were critical of Washington
State University administrators. Id.
Id. at 409 (holding that Demers’s publications were written and distributed as part of his
official duties as faculty member, and, therefore, were not protected speech).
Id. at 411.
Id. at 412.
186
187
188

189

190
191
192

193

194
195

394

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47

Instead, the Ninth Circuit held that cases involving academic freedom and
scholarship at the university level are best resolved using the traditional
Pickering-Connick balancing test. 196
Other circuits have not embraced this approach. 197 For example,
the Second Circuit recently ruled Garcetti foreclosed First Amendment
claims brought by a university adjunct professor who alleged he was not rehired after he reported students cheating. 198
Hopefully, the Supreme Court will clarify that Garcetti does not
apply to teaching and scholarship at some point. 199 Academic freedom,
scholarship, and teaching need the freedom to flourish. 200 Workplace
efficiency should not trump the ability of university professors to conduct
inquiry and question societal trends.
V.

CONCLUSION

The decision in Garcetti v. Ceballos has had tragic results for
countless public employees across the country. 201 It also represents a
significant “blot” on the First Amendment record of Justice Anthony
Kennedy. 202 As a direct result of Garcetti, many public employees keep their
mouths shut for fear of losing their jobs. The losers are not just individual
employees who get “Garcettized.” Rather it is the public at large, which is
deprived of important information pertaining to their tax dollars and the
administration of public programs, that is harmed. Garcetti understates the
importance of public employees’ speech to the public discourse writ large
and fails to consider the public’s First Amendment rights to information
about the functioning of their public institutions. Garcetti causes palpable
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harm not just to the individual employees, whose free-speech rights it
squelches, but to the interested public as well. 203
The Supreme Court made a major misstep by erecting such a
broad, categorical rule in Garcetti v. Ceballos. The decision is a
“jurisprudential disaster,” 204 and one of the worst decisions rendered by the
Court in recent memory. It unnecessarily and needlessly reduces and
disrespects the free-speech rights of tens of millions of people.
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No Free Speech for You, supra note 14.
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